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 1 
PART I 
Introduction 
A. Gambling with U.S. “Military Readiness” 
This analysis focuses first on a salient military issue: “Is U.S. military readiness being gambled away in the 
Twenty-First Century’s Age of Terrorism?” In analyzing this question a second issue arises regarding the 
potential bias of informational sources that are closely associated with the gambling industry and its financial 
leverage. Accordingly, there will be a review of concerns involving some informational sources on gambling 
issues which have been criticized in the national press as perhaps being too closely associated with the 
gambling industry and its financial leverage. One conclusion of this analysis is that because the costs outweigh 
the minimal benefits, the entire U.S. Armed Forces should reinstate the ban on video gambling devices (VGDs) 
on U.S. bases and other facilities—which was the intermittent policy of the U.S. Armed Forces throughout most 
of the Twentieth Century. A second recommendation is from the Columbia Journalism Review1 which suggests 
that military analysts and researchers should “follow the money”2 and “flat out ask”3 all sources of gambling 
information if those sources have ever received direct or indirect financial assistance from pro-gambling 
interests.4 
B. Gambling with Terrorism 
The comments of academics5 defending the rapid expansion of the U.S. gambling industry during the first years 
of the Twenty-First Century, as well as the 1990s, must be viewed in the context of the combined impact U.S. 
gambling has had on strategic U.S. political, economic, and defense policies.6 To stimulate the U.S. economy 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the 2002 Economic Stimulus Bill7 was designed to 
include major tax and economic incentives worth approximately $70 billion to $100 billion to the U.S. 
consumer economy.8 
                                                           
1 Stephen J. Simurda, When Gambling Comes To Town: How to Cover a High-Stakes Story, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., 
Jan./Feb. 1994, at 36–38 [hereinafter COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.]. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 37–38. 
4 Id. See also John W. Kindt, U.S. National Security and the Strategic Economic Base: The Business/Economic Impacts of 
the Legalization of Gambling Activities, 39 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 567 (1995) [hereinafter Strategic Economic Base], reprinted in 
National Gambling Impact & Policy Comm’n Act: Hearing on H.R. 497 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th 
Cong. 528–45 (1995) [hereinafter Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995]. 
5 See, e.g., John Gonzalez, Casino Backers are Studying Their Cards, FT. WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Feb. 15, 1995, at 28; 
George Kuempel, Senator Says He Has Votes to Block Casino, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 15, 1995, at A16. See also 
Letter from William Bryan, Associate Dean of Research, Editor, Illinois Business Review, to William Eadington, Professor, 
University of Nevada at Reno (Feb. 15, 1995) (on file with the author). Subsequent to his editorship, William Bryan became 
Dean of the Loyola University School of Business, and in 2000 he became Dean of the University of Illinois College of 
Commerce and Business Administration. For examples of unbalanced criticisms by William Eadington, see William 
Eadington, Comment, 23 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. (2003) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Eadington Comment]. 
6 See generally, John W. Kindt & Anne E. C. Brynn, Destructive Economic Policies in the Age of Terrorism: Government-
Sanctioned Gambling As Encouraging Transboundary Economic Raiding and Destabilizing National and International 
Economies, 16 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 243 (2002) [hereinafter Gambling’s Destabilizing Economies]. 
7 Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–147, 116 Stat. 21 (2002). 
8 Richard S. Dunham, Just When The Right Thought Big Government Was History, BUS. WK, Nov. 5, 2001, at 53; see Jim 
Drinkard, House Oks $100B For Economy: Stimulus Bill’s Tax Breaks Face Fight in the Senate, USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 
2001, at A5; John W. Kindt, Internationally, The 21st Century Is No Time for the United States to Be Gambling With the 
Economy: Taxpayers Subsidizing the Gambling Industry and the De Facto Elimination of All Casino Tax Revenues Via the 
2 John Warren Kindt 
Corporate tax-cut requests in the Economic Stimulus Bill, which were proposed for “product-oriented” 
companies, were chastised by the Wall Street Journal and were largely rejected; such as $2.3 billion for Ford 
ranging down to $9 million for Kroger.9 However, by comparison, the “nonproduct-oriented” gambling 
companies received a $40 billion tax gift from the U.S. taxpayers.10 In 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives 
Gaming Caucus maneuvered a provision into the Economic Stimulus package for gambling interests to write-
off $40 billion for slot machines and associated electronic devices11—a sector of the U.S. economy not only 
creating no products, but also draining “consumer dollars” away from the consumer economy. The leader of the 
Congressional Gambling Caucus had originally requested tax write-offs (for slot machines) which the Las 
Vegas press reported were worth approximately $133 billion.12 This latter amount was roughly comparable to 
one-half of the total regular annual budget for the U.S. Department of Defense13 or to approximately twice the 
$80 billion cost for the U.S. portion of the 2003 war with Iraq.14 As the Las Vegas press praised this $40 billion 
government payback to the gambling industry, which equated to all of the taxes paid by the casino industry for 
more than a decade,15 serious concerns were raised about the governmental decision-making process and the 
informational sources being utilized by the gambling industry to promote its interests—such as two well-used 
Arthur Andersen reports16 financed by the American Gaming Association (AGA) lobbying group.17 
An informed review of the research on gambling reveals that the gambling industry has lost the factual 
debate on “costs” versus “benefits.” Although the pro-gambling interests had substantial influence on the 1999 
National Gambling Impact Study Commission (NGISC or 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission) and were 
excoriated in the national press for trying to stack the Commission,18 the Commission’s Final Report19 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
2002 Economic Stimulus Act, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 363 (2003) [hereinafter Gambling With the Economy and the 
Elimination of All Casino Tax Revenues]. 
9 Bruce Bartlett, Tax Rebates Won’t Stimulate the Economy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2001, at A20; John D. McKinnon & 
Shailagh Murray, Companies Could Reap Big Tax Refunds from House Bill, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2001, at A28. See also 
Leslie Wayne, So, Friend, It’s Time for That Tax Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, § 3, at 1. 
10 Tony Batt, Tax Break for Slots OK’d: Measure Will Let Companies Deduct Technological Expenses, LAS VEGAS REV. J., 
Oct. 16, 2001 [hereinafter Tax Break $40 Billion for Slots]. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See U.S. Dep’t Defense, Annual Budget (2001); H.R. Rep. No. 106-945, at 3 et seq. (2000). See also OFFICE OF THE 
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEP’T DEFENSE, NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR FY 2002, at Tbl. 1-1 (Aug. 
2001), available at http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/fy2002budget/fy02grbk.pdf; U.S. Dep’t Defense, News Release: 
Department of Defense Amended Budget for FY 2001 (June 27, 2001), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun200l/b0627200l_bt287-01.html. 
14 See, e.g., Senate OKs $80 Billion War Package, NEWS-GAZETTE (Champaign, IL), Apr. 12, 2003, at A3. 
15 Compare, Tax Break $40 Billion for Slots, supra note 10, with Eugene M. Christiansen, Gaming Tax Rates Reach to the 
Sky as States Struggle, INT’L GAMING & WAGERING BUS., Aug. 2003, at 32. (U.S. gambling industry trade magazine). See 
also Gambling With the Economy and the Elimination of All Casino Tax Revenues, supra note 8; John W. Kindt, Would Re-
Criminalizing U.S. Gambling Pump-Prime the Economy and Could U.S. Gambling Facilities Be Transformed into 
Educational and High-Tech Facilities? Will the Legal Discovery of Gambling Companies’ Secrets Confirm Research 
Issues?, 8 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 169 (2003). 
16 Arthur Andersen, Economic Impacts of Casino Gaming in the United States: Micro Study (May 1997) (prepared for the 
Am. Gaming Ass’n, lobbying group) [hereinafter Am. Gaming Assoc./Andersen Micro Study]; Arthur Andersen, Economic 
Impacts of Casino Gaming In the United States: Macro Study  (Dec. 1996) (prepared for the Am. Gaming Ass’n, lobbying 
group) [hereinafter Am. Gaming Assoc./Andersen Macro Study]. 
17 Id. 
18 See, e.g., Editorial, Gambling Payoff?, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1997, at A18. See also John W. Kindt, The Failure to 
Regulate the Gambling Industry Effectively: Incentives for Perpetual Non-Compliance, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 219 (2003) 
[hereinafter Gambling’s Perpetual Non-Compliance]. 
19 NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT (June 1999), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html [hereinafter NGISC FINAL REPORT]. 
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demonstrated that the pro-gambling interests lost the cost/benefit debate. Accordingly, the Commission 
unanimously called for a moratorium on the expansion of U.S. legalized gambling activities.20 
However, pro-gambling financed academics/experts had not abandoned lauding the gambling industry. 
Furthermore, they began to challenge estimates of the social costs created by gambling that they initially had 
not questioned,21 and the industry’s strategy appeared to shift increasingly towards other methods such as 
attacking the credibility of the academic community22 and/or utilizing alleged intimidation tactics to circumvent 
or repress First Amendment debate.23 Regardless, any decision maker needs to “follow the money” and be alert 
to any informational bias linked to pro-gambling financial interests.24 
                                                           
20 Id. at introductory letter (Chair Kay C. James). For examples of analyses calling for the re-criminalization of gambling 
activities, see John W. Kindt & Stephen W. Joy, Internet Gambling and the Destabilization of National and International 
Economies: Time for a Comprehensive Ban on Gambling Over the World Wide Web, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 111 (2002) 
[hereinafter Gambling’s Destabilization of Economies]; Strategic Economic Base, supra note 4. 
21 See, e.g., Liz Benston, Expert: Problem Gambling Study Flawed, LAS VEGAS SUN, Mar. 31, 2003 at C1 [hereinafter 
Gambling Flawed] (countering a 2003 study on the social costs of gambling by Professor William Thompson, “the Nevada 
Resort Association [led by former pro-gambling NGISC Commissioner William Bible]—the chief lobbying group for 
Nevada casinos—commissioned a rebuttal report by Georgia College ... Assistant Professor Douglas Walker”). See 
generally, The Gambling Impact Study Commission: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th 
Cong., 156–57 (1995) [hereinafter Congressional Hearing on Gambling Impact Commission]. 
22 See, e.g., Gambling Flawed, supra note 21, at C1; COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., supra note 1, at 36–38. 
23 For an analysis of the First Amendment interface with the tobacco debate, see Donald W. Garner, Fighting the Tobacco 
Wars on First Amendment Grounds, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 379 (1998) [hereinafter Wars on First Amendment]. See also Press 
Release of Frank Fahrenkopf, CEO of Am. Gaming Assoc., Chicago, Ill. (May 21, 1998) (although most of the national 
press attended this press conference as concomitant to the hearings being conducted by the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission, Frank Fahrenkopf’s attacks on the academic community were ignored by all of the news media—except for 
the Las Vegas press). 
24 See COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., supra note 1, at 36–38 and accompanying text. 
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PART II 
Delimitation of Problems 
A. Gambling With U.S. “Military Readiness” 
In the context of U.S. military readiness, the issues are first the type of gambling and secondly whether that 
gambling impacts the military. In 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) produced its Report on the Effect of 
the Ready Availability of Slot Machines on Members of the Armed Forces, Their Dependents, and Others25 
(DOD 2001 Slots Report) which concluded that 2 percent of U.S. military personnel had a gambling problem, 
whereas the percentage for the general U.S. population was between .77 and 1.6 percent.26 Although the DOD 
2001 Slots Report was a cursory thirteen-page report, it basically confirmed earlier DOD reports of a 
pathological gambling problem of 2 percent among military personnel. 
The 2001 report reiterated that the DOD’s 199227 and 199828 reports indicated that there was a gambling 
problem among U.S. military personnel—particularly with regard to slot machines, electronic gambling devices 
(EGDs), and video gambling devices (VGDs), which are collectively referenced by sociologists as the “crack 
cocaine” of creating new addicted gamblers—a nomenclature also recognized by the 1999 U.S. Gambling 
Commission.29 
During Congressional hearings in 2000, U.S. Representative Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.) questioned Alphonso 
Maldon, Assistant Defense Secretary, “about the wisdom of operating slot machines in ‘a military where a 
number of our young families are on food stamps’.”30 During 1999, military personnel and civilian employees 
in the four Armed Services lost $127 million in approximately 8,000 slot machines located in 94 overseas bases 
and other posts.31 This scenario highlighted a historical resurgence of slot machine gambling on overseas 
military bases. 
In 1969, the Senate Government Operations Committee subcommittee on investigations 
looked into improprieties in the operation of slot machines and other recreational activities at 
servicemen’s clubs overseas. Two years later, Army Secretary Robert F. Froehlke ordered the 
removal of slot machines from every Army post and base, citing a “corruptive influence.” The 
Air Force joined the Army in destroying thousands of machines; the Navy and Marines kept 
theirs in place.32 
The Congressional hearings in 2000 prompted the DOD 2001 Slots Report. 
                                                           
25 SEC’Y DEF., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON THE EFFECT OF THE READY AVAILABILITY OF SLOT MACHINES ON MEMBERS OF 
THE ARMED FORCES, THEIR DEPENDENTS, AND OTHERS (2001) [hereinafter DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT]. 
26 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 4–6, tbl. 4–2. 
27 NAT’L TECH. INFORMATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., 1992 WORLDWIDE SURVEY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND HEALTH 
BEHAVIORS AMONG MILITARY PERSONNEL at 12–14 to 12–30 [hereinafter MILITARY PERSONNEL 1992 REPORT]. 
28 ROBERT M. BRAY ET AL., 1998 DEP’T OF DEF. SURVEY OF HEALTH RELATED BEHAVIORS AMONG MILITARY PERSONNEL 
[hereinafter DOD 1998 HEALTH AMONG MILITARY]. 
29 Laurence Arnold, Overseas Slot Machines Are Military’s Billion-Dollar Gamble, Jan. 13, 2001, at 1, available at 
http://lexis-nexis.com [hereinafter Slot Machines Military’s Gamble]. See also Viveca Novak, They Call It Video Crack, 
TIME, June 1, 1998, at 58 [hereinafter Video Crack]. See generally, NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 5–5. 
30 Slot Machines Military’s Gamble, supra note 29. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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B. The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Act 
In the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Act, Public Law 106-398,33 approved on October 30, 2000, the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense was required to submit another report to Congress, 
evaluating the effect that the ready availability of slot machines as a morale, welfare, and 
recreation activity on United States military installations outside of the United States has on 
members of the military, their dependents, and other persons who use such slot machines, the 
morale of military communities overseas, and the personal financial stability of members of 
the Armed Forces.34 
The report was required to include an estimate of the number of persons who used the slot machines over 
the preceding two years, giving a percentage breakdown into the following groups: enlisted members, officers, 
DOD civilians, other U.S. persons, and foreign nationals.35 The law also required the Defense Department to 
give information on military personnel showing the number (as a percentage and by pay grade) who had 
“sought financial services counseling at least partially due to the use of such slot machines;” or “qualified for 
Government financial assistance at least partially due to the use of such slot machines;” or “had a personal 
check returned for insufficient funds or received any other nonpayment notification from a creditor at least 
partially due to the use of such slot machines;” and also report the “average amount expended by each category” 
of personnel.36 
Representative Bartlett’s concerns prompted provisions to require the DOD 2001 Slots Report to analyze 
the impact of video gambling machines and devices on military personnel.37 The research contract was won by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers.38 It was anticipated that an in-depth report would be forthcoming, however, 
[t]he firm’s study was abruptly cancelled midway through the process ... The Pentagon 
claimed that the consultants’ plans were not what Congress wanted, according to Lisa Wright, 
Bartlett’s press secretary . . . “The Pentagon decided to do the study in-house,” said Ms. 
Wright. PricewaterhouseCoopers declined comment ... Not just any section of the Pentagon 
took over the research. The Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Department—the very 
department that uses profits from slot machine—conducted the study, according to the 
Pentagon. The thirteen-page report was highly supportive of slot machines.39 
Accordingly, it would be difficult to find agreement with any suggestion that this cursory thirteen-page, 
conflict-of-interest report was the final word on gambling addiction in the U.S. military—as was argued by 
William Eadington of the University of Nevada at Reno.40 
C. DOD 2001 Slots Report on the Effect of Slot Machines 
After reviewing the information available, and as Mr. Eadington highlighted, it was “the Department’s opinion 
that the presence of slot machines in Morale, Welfare, and Recreation facilities overseas does not have a 
negative effect on the morale or financial stability” of their forces, forces’ families, or civilian employees.41 
However, the DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT did indicate that there were “instances where slot machine use has had 
a negative impact on specific individuals.”42 Actually, the 1998 Department of Defense Survey of Health 
                                                           
33 Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106–398, 114 Stat. 1654 (2000). 
34 Id. at § 336(a). 
35 Id. at § 336(b)(1). 
36 Id. at §§ 336(b)(2)(A)–(C), (b)(3). 
37 Maura Casey, Military Secrets: Gambling Problems Stay Hushed Up, THE DAY (New London, Conn.), Mar. 17, 2002, at 
H1, H4 [hereinafter Casey]. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Eadington Comment, supra note 5, at n.5 
41 DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT, supra note 25, at 3. See Eadington Comment, supra note 5, at n.5. 
42 DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT, supra note 25, at 3. 
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Related Behaviors Among Military Personnel (DOD 1998 Health Among Military Report) had already found 
that about 2.2 percent of military personnel had the indicators of probable pathological gambling (compared 
with .77 to 1.6 percent in the general public),43 but the thirteen-page DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT equivocated that 
“these results should not be considered to be a conclusive indication that the prevalence of pathological 
gambling is higher in the military personnel than among civilians.”44 This equivocation was a non sequitur 
because the reported numbers were indeed a “conclusive indication” that pathological gambling was higher in 
the military than in the general public—as reported by several in-depth analyses to the 1999 U.S. National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission.45 Senior commanders on the bases concluded that “the presence [as 
opposed to use] of these machines produces no causative negative impact on morale or financial well being of 
the force.”46 The DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT justified itself stating that the Services’ slot machines “include a 
high rate of return to the player and high payout frequencies” combined with limited payout amounts to 
discourage players from losing too much of their money by going for big jackpots.47 However, these arguments 
were illusory because they ignored the fundamental principles that slot machines are inherently designed: to 
lure in the player, to keep the player thinking he is winning when he is in fact losing, and eventually to take as 
much of the player’s assets as possible. 
The DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT also claimed that the Services’ slot machines were neither promoted nor 
encouraged, but it was highlighted that the revenue generated from slot machines constituted “a major 
component of each Services’ ability to fund nonappropriated fund programs, capital investments and major 
construction.”48 Importantly, the DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT indicated that the “[l]oss of this revenue source 
could not be replicated,”49 which perhaps indicated that monetary considerations and creating the appearance of 
military readiness were driving the DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT because it contradicted not only the DOD’s 1992 
and 1998 reports,50 but also the Final Report of the National Gambling Impact Study Commission.51 
The analysis and conclusions in the thirteen-page DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT, as well as the conflicts of 
interest in its authorship, were sharply criticized in the press.52 The DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT was also 
compelled to contradict earlier complaints about gambling from U.S. Command Personnel. In 1995, General 
John M. Loh, Commander of the United States Air Force (USAF) at Langley Air Force Base (AFB), replied to a 
letter from U.S. Representative Herbert H. Bateman requesting General Loh’ s views on the subject of riverboat 
gambling.53 General Loh stated, “I am generally opposed to riverboat gambling near our bases because of the 
problems it creates for our people and the communities in which they live.”54 General Loh also explained that 
key indicators of gambling’s effect on social and family issues had increased since the opening of riverboat 
gambling operations near Barksdale AFB in Louisiana.55 In closing, the General indicated: “These are my 
personal views and do not reflect any official position of the Air Force or DoD.”56 
A related 1995 memorandum to Virginia cities from business-related representatives of Know Casinos, a 
non-profit organization dedicated to “providing Virginia with factual information on riverboat gambling,” gave 
a brief overview of the negative issues surrounding riverboat gambling and the military, including some specific 
                                                           
43 DOD 1998 HEALTH AMONG MILITARY, supra note 28. 
44 DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT, supra note 25, at 6. 
45 Compare id., with NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 4–6, tbl. 4–2. 
46 DOD 2001 SLOTS REPORT, supra note 25, at 3. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 8. 
49 Id. at 13. 
50 See MILITARY PERSONNEL 1992 REPORT, supra note 27; DOD 1998 HEALTH AMONG MILITARY, supra note 28, and 
accompanying text. 
51 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 4–6, tbl. 4–2. 
52 See, e.g., Casey, supra note 37, at H1, H4. 
53 Letter from Gen. John M. Loh, Commander, U.S. Air Force, to U.S. Rep. Herbert H. Bateman, Congressman (Feb. 10, 
1995) (on file with U.S. Rep. Herbert H. Bateman). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
8 John Warren Kindt 
information about the military base in Tidewater, Virginia.57 The memorandum concluded that “[r]iverboat 
gaming will drive our military away and cause us to lose whatever new opportunities might become 
available.”58 The business-oriented authors also found it hard to accept that city leaders would continue to seek 
gambling when there was “such an obvious negative impact.”59 
D. Informational Sources on Gambling Issues: The Potential Impact of the Financial Aura of Pro-
Gambling Interests 
1. Attempted Censorship by Pro-Gambling Interests? 
In 1998 Christopher Anderson, the Director of the Illinois Council on Problem and Compulsive Gambling, 
served together on a three-person panel with William Eadington and John Kindt and testified under oath before 
the U.S. National Gambling Impact Study Commission.60 While the opportunity for debate was obvious, pro-
gambling interests did not challenge or address any of the issues raised involving the substantial socio-
economic costs of legalizing gambling activities,61 but instead those interests waited until 2003 before 
attempting any substantial rebuttal to refute the socio-economic costs reported by several academics.62 
However, Christopher Anderson’s testimony before the Commission, although tactful, still cost Anderson his 
livelihood. 
The controversy erupted after the council’s outspoken executive director, Christopher 
Anderson, publicly criticized the casino boats for being too liberal with credit and allowing 
hard-luck gamblers to dig themselves deeper into debt. He says the Illinois Casino Gaming 
Assn. promptly accused him of “biting the hand that feeds him.” Soon, he says, he was 
notified in writing that the council’s funding for the new year would be on a month-to-month 
basis, with a 10-day termination clause.63 
Since the Illinois Council was almost totally supported by $160,000 from the Illinois riverboat operators, 
their financial leverage was considerable. These actions by the gambling industry were “interpreted as 
interference and intimidation” by the Illinois Council.64 “Outraged, Anderson says the council severed its casino 
ties, closed its offices to save money and moved into his living room.”65 According to Anderson, “[e]veryone 
out there with casino money is obligated to stroke the casinos … To the extent that any of us accept dollars 
from the industry ... without the expectation that there are strings attached, then we’re the fools.”66 
Representatives of the Illinois casino association countered that they simply transferred their support to a 
private firm.67 
                                                           
57 Memorandum from Know Casinos, Business Group, to Virginia Cities, (Sept. 1, 1995) (on file with Know Casinos). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Christopher Anderson, William Eadington, and John W. Kindt, Panel Testimony before the National Gambling Impact 
Study Commission (May 21, 1998); NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, and accompanying text. 
61 Tables of the socio-economic costs of new addicted gamblers, bankruptcies, and crime caused by decriminalized 
organized gambling, as presented at this hearing of the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission, were subsequently published as 
tables in John W. Kindt, The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Should the States Initiate Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the Tobacco 
Cases?, 22 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 17, Tables (2001) [hereinafter Mega-Lawsuits]. See also John W. Kindt & John 
K. Palchak, Legalized Gambling’s Destabilization of U.S. Financial Institutions and the Banking Industry: Issues in 
Bankruptcy, Credit, and Social Norm Production, 19 EMORY U. BANKRUPTCY DEV. J. 21 (2002) [hereinafter Gambling’s 
Destabilization of Financial Institutions]. 
62 See, e.g., Gambling Flawed, supra note 21, and accompanying text. 
63 Matea Gold, Treatment Options Scarce for Gamblers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at A1 [hereinafter Treatment Options]. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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The criticism of “censorship attempts” by pro-gambling interests was also exemplified after a September 
1993 seminar at Lake Tahoe, when Whittier Law Professor I. Nelson Rose “ticked off”68 Tom Tait, the 
executive director of Nevada’s Commission on Tourism, who issued “an official state press release”69 alleging 
that “in his presentation before the conference, I. Nelson Rose accused Nevada gaming officials and gaming 
executives of being in ‘cahoots,’ calling their relationship corrupt.”70 Thereafter, Tait “uninvited” Professor 
Rose from a December statewide Nevada convention on travel and tourism by removing Rose from the list of 
speakers.71 The statewide press editorialized against these actions limiting Professor Rose from expressing his 
viewpoint.72 
Zounds. How dare this rapscallion Rose say such a thing. No Nevada gaming official has ever 
gone to work for the industry the day after he or she quit, right? No juice law firm or 
gambling company would ever hire an ex-regulator, would they? No law or p.r. firm ever got 
a rack of politicians elected and then brokered influence in favor of gaming license applicants, 
correct? And nobody has ever accused the Nevada Supreme Court of jumping through hoops 
for the gambling-industrial complex, especially on those messy fire-at-will and employee 
wrongful termination cases. 
Iconoclastic Nelson Rose apparently committed the unpardonable sin: he categorized 
the obvious, making him pariah non grata at the Reno Hilton extravaganza. Rose was 
needed.73 
Mirroring First Amendment censorship issues, similar instances have occurred with other academics74 
when interfacing with hypersensitive pro-gambling interests. As exemplified at a 1995 Boston Federal Reserve 
Bank Conference, gambling company representatives have also apparently sent disparaging letters behind-the-
scenes to conference organizers, trying to discredit academic attendees/speakers, such as Professor Rose.75 
As indicated in the Mega-Lawsuits article, those familiar with the topics in gambling research typically 
agree that it is difficult to find objective research regarding the impact of legalized gambling on communities.76 
In fact, “[m]uch of the research that has been used in government decision making was prepared by researchers 
with close ties to the gambling industry.”77 As summarized by Professor Henry Lesieur of the Institute for 
Problem Gambling in Connecticut: 
There isn’t one piece of research the industry has funded on the social costs of problem 
gambling that is academically respectable. It’s all self-serving .... It says a lot about the nature 
of the field that research funded by the industry is going to dominate the dialogue for the next 
few years. That is a sad state.78 
                                                           
68 Andrew Barbano, Editorial, Clipping Coupons to Buy the Emperor New Clothes, THE TRIBUNE (Reno, Nev.), Dec. 19, 
1993 [hereinafter Buy the Emperor New Clothes]. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Wayne R. Melton, Panel Director Cuts Expert from List of Conference Speakers, RENO GAZETTE-J., Dec. 11, 1993, at C8; 
see Editorial, Gaming Critic Should Have Been Admitted, , RENO GAZETTE-J., Dec. 15, 1993, at 11A [hereinafter Gaming 
Critic Should Have Been Admitted]. 
72 See, e.g., Melton, supra note 71; Gaming Critic Should Have Been Admitted, supra note 71. 
73 Buy the Emperor New Clothes, supra note 68. 
74 See, e.g., Press Release, Senate Republican Leadership, Conference at Foxwoods Gives Long Odds on the Truth, Conn. 
Capitol Press Room, Nov. 8, 1995. See also David Ferrell & Matea Gold, Casino Industry Fights an Emerging Backlash, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Casino Backlash] (describing alleged harassment of UNLV Prof. William 
Thompson). See also Wars on First Amendment, supra note 23. 
75 Joan Vennochi, High Stakes, BOSTON GLOBE, May 31, 1995, at 39. 
76 Meir Gross, Legal Gambling as a Strategy for Economic Development, 12 ECON. DEV. Q. 203, 204 (1998). 
77 Id. at 204. See generally, Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 61. 
78 Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at A24. 
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State and federal government officials began to recognize these problems at the end of the 1990s and 
expressed their frustration. 
2. The American Gaming Association’s “Clearinghouse of Information” 
In 1996, the lobbying group for the gambling industry, the American Gaming Association (AGA), headed by 
Frank Fahrenkopf, announced that part of the AGA’s responsibility was “to develop a clearinghouse for 
addressing industry issues, including problem gambling.”79 In this “clearinghouse” context, concerns were 
raised about potential conflicts of interest, such as in the following piece in the Los Angeles Times: 
For years, [Howard] Shaffer had voiced some of the harshest warnings in academia against 
the collateral damage of gambling’s growth. No longer, not since he accepted nearly $600,000 
in grants from the industry in little more than a year. 
Through Fahrenkopf’s intervention, Shaffer was awarded the first grant by the industry-
backed research center [NCRG]—$139,000 ….80 
The largely industry-financed National Center for Responsible Gaming (NCRG), which had AGA lobbyist 
Frank Fahrenkopf as a Board Member, was delimited as “the first national organization to serve as a 
clearinghouse for information concerning problem and underage gambling.”81 It was also reported that the 
NCRG’s Advisory Board would “have control over the research agenda and findings.”82 Additional public 
concerns involving research funded by pro-gambling interests were mentioned. 
The content of this first study by Shaffer was criticized,83 and it also did not report the most 
important baseline numbers for the 120–152 studies analyzed,84 which made it impossible for 
other academics to check and verify.85 Despite requests dating to 1998,86 and despite 
promising to provide these numbers during a 4 May 2000 conference sponsored by the NCRG 
                                                           
79 Gaming Association Acts as Clearinghouse, RENO GAZETTE-J. (Reno, Nev.), Oct. 27, 1996, at B5 (emphasis added) 
[hereinafter AGA Clearinghouse]. 
80 Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at A1 (emphasis added). For criticisms and debates regarding academics receiving 
inordinate amounts of funding from pro-gambling interests, see, e.g., Letter to the Editor from Jennifer Borrell, THE WAGER, 
available at http://www.thewager.org/editorial.htm (Apr. 3, 2003) (on file with the author); Letter to the Editor from Jacques 
Boulet, THE WAGER, available at http://www.thewager.org/editorial.htm (Apr. 3, 2003) (on file with the author). 
81 Charles Ruud, Harvard Studies Gambling, FLORIDA PLAYER, Summer 1996, at 3 (apparently from a press release of the 
National Center for Responsible Gaming). 
82 Id. (emphasis added). 
83 Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at A1; see Loretta Tofani, Gambling Industry Seeks a Winning Image, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
July 6, 1998, at A1 [hereinafter Gambling Seeks Image]. 
84 Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at A1; Gambling Seeks Image, supra note 83, at A1. See Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. 
Hall & Joni Vander Bilt, DIV. ADDICTIONS, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL, App. 2, Estimating the Prevalence of Disordered 
Gambling Behavior in the United States and Canada: A Meta-analysis, (Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions 
Meta-analysis]; Press Release of Harvard Medical School, Harvard Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence of 
Gambling Disorders in North America, (Dec. 4, 1997) (stating that from .84 percent in 1993 “the prevalence rate for 1994–
1997 grew to 1.29 percent of the adult population”) [hereinafter Harvard Division on Addictions Press Release]. 
85 For press criticisms, see Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at A1 (a classic series in the L.A. TIMES); Gambling Seeks 
Image, supra note 83; David L. Wheeler, A Surge of Research on Gambling is Financed in Part by the Industry Itself, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 5, 1999, at A17–18 [hereinafter Research Financed by Industry]; Virginia Young, Gambling 
Addiction: A No-Win Wager: Casinos Fund Problem Gambling Research; Critics Worry About their Influence, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 10, 2000, at A9–A10 [hereinafter Young]; Critics Question Casinos’ Commitment to Finding Cause of 
Gambling Addiction, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 10, 2000, at A1. 
86 Prof. John Warren Kindt, Univ. of Ill., Statement to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, U.S. and 
International Concerns Over the Socio-Economic Costs of Legalized Gambling: Greater than the Illegal Drug Problem? 
Chicago, Ill. (May 21, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. and International Costs]. 
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at the University of Illinois at Chicago Medical Center,87 by the end of 2000, Associate 
Professor Shaffer had apparently not provided the requested baseline numbers88—a fairly 
simple procedure.89 
To avoid these types of issues, academics should be sensitized to making data readily accessible and 
consider disassociating themselves from the NCRG, which even industry reports have delimited as the “Center 
of Controversy.”90 
These types of scenarios are illustrative of the problematic situations in which academics/experts can find 
themselves. As summarized by a Los Angeles Times article in December 1998, “Shaffer is now working on a 
new project for the industry’s research arm [the NCRG]—of which he is a board member—for $465,000, more 
than triple the amount of the first award.”91 Supposedly concerned with some research issues at the NCRG 
during this time frame,92 Professor Henry Lesieur and Dr. Richard Rosenthal terminated their relationship with 
the NCRG research board. 
With regard to the NCRG’s research, one criticism is that it is pre-directed: “‘[t]hey have an agenda,’ says 
Valerie Lorenz, executive director of the Compulsive Gambling Center Inc. in Baltimore. If the industry can say 
something is neurologically wrong with a problem gambler, ‘then it’s not the casinos’ responsibility,’ she 
says.”93 
Among other academics, Professor Henry Lesieur and Dr. Richard Rosenthal appeared to have made some 
difficult decisions concerning their academic independence. In the Twenty-First Century, more academics 
beginning research into gambling issues would be faced with ethical decisions, and it became increasingly 
important to delimit the origins and parameters of the issue areas. 
3. The Credibility of Pro-Gambling Interests: Issues Involving Impeachment 
a. The Gravamen of Gambling Issues 
The result of having industry-influenced academics and experts was that incomplete studies were often created 
to flood decisionmakers with information that obfuscated the obvious facts that legalized gambling activities 
were addictive and destructive to local and national economic systems. While the credibility of some 
academics/experts could be impeached by showing the financial influence and other tactics the gambling 
industry uses to influence information, that credibility could also be criticized by analyzing the implausible and 
nonsensical claims of the industry. In 2003, apologists for the gambling industry tried to refute the principles 
establishing the addictive nature of Video Gambling Devices (VGDs)94 and discounted the negative socio-
economic impacts of gambling activities.95 
                                                           
87 Speaker’s Question and Answer Session with Assoc. Prof. Howard Shaffer, Understanding Gambling and Its Potential 
Health Consequences, Medical Ctr., Univ. of Ill., Chicago, Ill. (May 4, 2000) (registration through the National Center for 
Responsible Gaming). 
88 See, e.g., Letter from Univ. of Ill. Research Assoc., to Assoc. Prof. Howard Shaffer (May 10, 2000) (requesting baseline 
numbers); Letter from Assoc. Prof. Howard Shaffer to Univ. of Ill. Research Assoc. (May 31, 2000) (stating uncertainty and 
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89 Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 61, at 27. See also footnote 80, supra and accompanying text. 
90 Dave Palermo, Center of Controversy, CASINO EXEC. REP., Sept. 2001, at 4 [hereinafter Center of Controversy]. 
91 Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at A1 (emphasis added). 
92 See generally, id. 
93 Young, supra note 85. 
94 See Video Crack, supra note 29, at 58. See also Casino Backlash, supra note 74, at A1. 
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21. 
12 John Warren Kindt 
b. The Crack Cocaine of Creating New Addicted Gamblers: Electronic/Video Gambling Devices 
Defenders of the gambling industry are exemplified by the arguments of William Eadington, who has implied 
that electronic gambling devices (EGDs) and video gambling machines (VGMs) are not addictive and that 
comparing them to drug addictions constitutes an overreaction.96 The fact, however, is that it is generally 
accepted within the sociological community that pathological gambling can be fairly compared to drug 
addiction.97 Even Eadington’s associate and co-editor of the Journal of Gambling Studies, Associate Professor 
Howard Shaffer, who serves at the Harvard Division on Addictions and who has conducted studies financed by 
pro-gambling interests, has made several comparisons between pathological gambling and the addictive nature 
of drugs. In 1997 Shaffer concluded that gambling problems were “approaching the level of social problems 
such as drug abuse.”98 In the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission’s Final Report, Shaffer is 
quoted as follows: “The director of the Harvard Medical School’s Division on Addiction Studies, Dr. Howard J. 
Shaffer, likened the Internet to new delivery forms for addictive narcotics. He states, ‘As smoking crack cocaine 
changed the cocaine experience, I think electronics is going to change the way gambling is experienced.’”99 
In another instance, Shaffer reiterated his findings: 
One of the nation’s foremost experts on gambling addiction, Harvard Medical School 
Professor Howard Shaffer, was the first to call video poker the “crack cocaine of gambling.”... 
“These fast-acting games are like fast-acting drugs. You get a rush (when you win), and then 
you’re off, and you’re still there to play again,” he added. 
Even though no drug is involved, Shaffer said many gambling addicts show some signs of 
physical withdrawal when they stop feeding their habit—just as if they were hooked on heroin 
and in need of a fix.100 
Shaffer even drew comparisons between gambling addiction and the mega-lawsuits involving the smokers 
who pursued the 1990s tobacco litigation. “Shaffer said some gambling addicts have sued slot machine 
manufacturers, following the example set by victims of cigarette smokers who went after tobacco companies ... 
None of it has been successful yet, but it wasn’t for the tobacco industry for a long time” (emphasis added).101 
As early as 1994, Shaffer summarized these issues and reportedly concluded as follows, 
between 3.5 and 5 percent of those adults exposed to gambling can be expected to develop 
into pathological gamblers. Even more disturbing, the percentage is higher (6 to 8.5 percent) 
for college and high school students, according to Shaffer’s most recent research. “It’s like 
crack was to cocaine. It’s becoming too easy to gamble.”102 
Accordingly, Mr. Eadington has little academic support for his apparent rejection of the sociologists’ 
identifier for video gambling and other “fast gambling” mechanisms as the “crack cocaine” of creating new 
pathological (addicted) gamblers. 
                                                           
96 See Eadington Comment, supra note 5. 
97 See, e.g., Marvin A. Steinberg, Therese A. Kosten, & Bruce J. Rounsaville, Cocaine Abuse and Pathological Gambling, 1 
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c. The Socio-Economic Costs of Decriminalized Organized Gambling 
From an academic perspective, Mr. Eadington is also unconvincing when he repeatedly tries to refute Nobel-
Prize Laureate Paul Samuelson’s103 conclusions about the negative economic impacts of gambling activities.104 
Nor does Mr. Eadington appear to grasp the significance that Professor Samuelson’s comments constitute basic 
textbook economics.105 
In particular, Mr. Eadington criticizes the references to Professor Samuelson’s comments which highlight 
the negative economic impacts of gambling activities. Eadington has implied that references in Professor 
Samuelson’ s textbook may have consisted of offhand comments which Samuelson had not seriously studied.106 
The Samuelson quote at issue stated: 
 [Gambling] involves simply sterile transfers of money or goods between individuals, creating 
no new money or goods. Although it creates no output, gambling does nevertheless absorb 
time and resources. When pursued beyond the limits of recreation, where the main purpose 
after all is to “kill” time, gambling subtracts from the national income.107 
Mr. Eadington’ s implication, however, that Professor Samuelson has not seriously analyzed the economics 
of gambling activities, is also dispelled by referencing the classic 1948 article by Milton Friedman and L. J. 
Savage, entitled The Utility Analysis Of Choices Involving Risk,108 which constituted an in-depth academic study 
of utility and gambling activities. This study was an exhaustive analysis of the general principles enumerated in 
Samuelson’s textbook in his section Gambling and Diminishing Marginal Utility. More importantly, when this 
classic Friedman and Savage article was reprinted in 1952, the authors made a “grateful” acknowledgement to 
Paul Samuelson who had obviously studied their article and who had suggested the one correction which was 
incorporated into the reprinted version of the article.109 
John Kenneth Galbraith referred to Samuelson as the “most influential [economics] teacher of our time,”110 
but Samuelson’s views on gambling have been repeatedly attacked by the American Gaming Association. The 
American Gaming Association, lobbying for the gambling industry, has even claimed that legalized gambling 
activities have an economic multiplier effect of “four,”111 a nonsensical claim. As decriminalized organized 
gambling spread throughout the U.S. economy of the 1990s, the increased commentary, which Samuelson 
devoted to the gambling/economic interface, was illustrative. For example, Samuelson reaffirmed his position in 
a later edition of his text which is significant enough to quote at length: 
Gambling has historically been a “vice” that was—along with illegal drugs, commercial sex, 
alcohol and tobacco—a “consumption activity” discouraged by the state. Attitudes about such 
vices ebb and flow. Over the last two decades, attitudes toward gambling became permissive 
as those toward drugs and tobacco hardened . . . . [The] spread [of gambling] was 
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104 See Eadington Comment, supra note 5. 
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accompanied by the rapid growth of state lotteries. Overall, gambling has been one of the 
fastest growing sectors of the (legal) economy in the last two decades [1980s and 1990s].112 
Samuelson also differentiated economic speculation from decriminalized organized gambling—which 
gambling lobbyists frequently argue are the same concept in their efforts to decriminalize more gambling 
activities as the Twenty-First Century began. 
Gambling is a differential animal from speculation. While ideal speculative activity increases 
economic welfare, gambling raises serious economic issues. To begin with, aside from 
recreational value, gambling does not create goods and services. In the language of game 
theory gambling is a “negative-sum game” for the players—the customers are (almost) sure to 
lose in the long run because the house takes a cut of all bets. In addition, by its very nature 
gambling increases income inequality. People who sit down to the gambling table with the 
same amount of money go away with widely different amounts. A gambler’s family must 
expect to be on top of the world one week only to be living on crumbs and remorse when luck 
changes. Some observers also believe that gambling has adverse social impacts. These include 
addiction to gambling, neighborhood crime, political corruption, and infiltration of gambling 
by organized crime. 
Given the substantial economic case against gambling, how can we understand the 
recent trend to legalize gambling and operate government lotteries? One reason is that when 
states are starved for tax revenues, they look for new sources; they rationalize lotteries and 
casinos in a way to channel private vices to the public interest by skimming off some of the 
revenues to finance public projects. In addition, by bringing gambling above ground, legal 
gambling may drive out illegal numbers rackets and take some of the profitability out of 
organized crime. Notwithstanding these rationales, many observers raise questions about an 
activity in which the state profits by promoting irrational behavior among those who can least 
afford it.113 
While individualized gambling activities have accompanied the history of mankind, government-sanctioned 
gambling activities, including those by military organizations, have historically resulted in socio-economic 
negatives that outweighed any positives.114 Furthermore, gambling activities constitute a “sterile transfer of 
wealth” which restricts genuine economic growth. The opportunity costs to those governments which legalize 
gambling activities consist, in part, of lost worker and military productivity as well as lost “consumer 
dollars.”115 While the introduction of gambling-oriented dollars into a local economy may have a multiplier 
effect, there is a growing body of evidence that in most economic scenarios the gambling multiplier is 
significantly less than the lost multiplier associated with lost consumer dollars.116 
Accordingly, governments and concomitant military organizations have experimented with legalized (or 
tolerated) gambling activities throughout history, sometimes referenced as waves of gambling. As the public 
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and the military have relearned the significant costs which invariably accompany gambling, governments have 
reverted to the recriminalization of gambling activities.117 
These examples suggest the absence of credibility by informational sources linked to the financial aura of 
the gambling industry, but they are not the only instances. Attacks on academics by pro-gambling interests 
demonstrate how pro-gambling misinformation can enter the decisionmaking environment and lead to the 
reliance of well-intentioned decisionmakers on information of dubious quality and credibility. 
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PART III 
Clarification of Goals 
A. The 1998 Department of Defense Survey of Health Related Behaviors Among Military Personnel118 
The DOD 1998 Health Among Military Report provided “comprehensive and detailed estimates of the 
prevalence of alcohol, illicit drug, and tobacco use and the negative effects of alcohol use”119 and gave estimates 
for health behaviors “pertaining to fitness and cardiovascular disease risk reduction, injuries and injury 
prevention, and sexually transmitted disease risk reduction.”120 The 1998 Report also offered “an assessment of 
the mental health of military personnel, including stress and depression, and examines oral health and dental 
check-ups, gambling behaviors, and special gender-specific health issues.”121 
In the section of the report on military gambling, it was noted that 8.1% of the total DOD group “had 
experienced at least one of the eight gambling related problems in their lifetime, indicating problem gambling, 
and 2.2% experienced at least three of these gambling related problems, the level constituting probable 
pathological gambling.”122 Researchers also presented findings on the relationship between gambling and 
drinking. According to the researchers, “data on drinking levels indicate an increased likelihood of a person in 
the military being a problem or pathological gambler with higher drinking levels, although the vast majority 
(84.8%) of heavy drinkers had never experienced any gambling-related problems.”123 The researchers explained 
that if personnel were not screened for gambling problems when they were admitted into alcohol treatment, 
their problems might go unnoticed.124 They also concluded that there might be a “higher prevalence of 
gambling-related problems” in those personnel who had undetected or untreated alcohol problems.125 
B. Gamblers in the Military: Reducing the High Rates of Pathological and Problem Gambling 
In 1997, a group of Harvard associates analyzed the topic of “Gamblers in the Military”126 by reviewing the 
DOD Military Personnel 1992 Report 127 conducted by the Research Triangle Institute and directed by the 
Department of Defense.128 The survey examined substance abuse and health-related behaviors and was the first 
DOD survey to include questions about problem gambling.129 According to the authors at the Harvard Medical 
School Division on Addictions who reviewed the survey, the researchers “hypothesized that problems related to 
excessive gambling could affect the financial and psychological well-being of military personnel, which could 
have a negative effect on military readiness.”130 The survey showed that 7.1 percent of the respondents had a 
gambling-related problem, and 2 percent met the criteria for probable pathological gambling.131 The 1992 
survey was also used to examine the relationships between problem gambling and alcohol use. Problems with 
gambling were found to be more common in heavy drinkers as distinguished from abstainers and light drinkers, 
but “nearly 90% of heavy drinkers had never experienced any problems with gambling.”132 
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C. Data Collection on Gambling Problems in the Military: Screening Veterans for Pathological Gambling 
In 1998, the Harvard Medical School Division on Addictions reported on research involving the screening of 
veterans for pathological gambling.133 The Division on Addictions indicated that “individuals with substance 
abuse or other psychiatric disorders have been shown to have higher rates of pathological gambling disorders 
than individuals without psychiatric disorders.”134 At the time of reporting, the researchers had “routinely 
screened a sample of 250 veterans with substance abuse and/or other psychiatric disorders” in the previous three 
years for lifetime pathological gambling disorders.135 Using the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS), 16 
percent of the veterans screened positive for pathological gambling while 9 percent screened positive for 
“probable pathological gambling.”136 In a medical record review of veterans found positive for pathological 
gambling, researchers reported that “only 1 had been diagnosed with a pathological gambling disorder.”137 Also, 
compared to a non-problem group, the researchers revealed that “pathological gamblers were admitted 
significantly more often for psychiatric problems and for drug or alcohol detoxification,”138 and it was reported 
that these research estimates fell within the range given by a Harvard meta-analysis of prevalence studies.139 
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PART IV 
Historical Background 
A. Pathological and Problem Gambling in the Military 
From 1992 data provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) as part of a worldwide health survey of 
military personnel,140 it was reported in 1998 that “Since 1991 Legalized Gambling has Destabilized the 
‘Readiness’ of U.S. Military Personnel by a 66% Increase in Addicted Gambling.”141 This DOC data revealed 
that of the 1.5 million military personnel in the Armed Services in 1991, 2 percent were pathological gamblers, 
while approximately 5 percent were problem gamblers.142According to the DOC data, if both the “pathological” 
and “problem” gambler categories increased proportionally from 1994–1997, a 66 percent increase would occur 
by 1997, which would represent approximately 50,250 and 162,000 military personnel in the pathological and 
problem gambling categories, respectively.143 These conclusions and concerns were not effectively dispelled by 
the cursory DOD 2001 Slots Report.144 
B. U.S. Senator Estes Kefauver and the 1950s Hearings on Illegal Gambling145 
In the 1940s and 1950s, the Gold Coast of Mississippi harbored many sites of illegal gambling which were 
purported to make the Coast more attractive to tourists.146 In the 1990s the gambling joints were replaced by 
legalized casino hotels credited with igniting the “Mississippi miracle,” an economic boom.147 Investigations 
into the Mississippi clubs’ gambling activities began in 1950 with hearings conducted by U.S. Senator Estes 
Kefauver and continued into 1951 when he transferred control of the probe over to U.S. Senator Lyndon 
Johnson. These investigations caused a temporary halt in some of the then illegal gambling activity.148 Senator 
Kefauver contended that “open gambling and liquor posed a threat to the military preparedness of airmen”149 
and the illegal “gambling, Kefauver said, was eating up [twelve to twenty percent] ... of Keesler’s $4 million 
monthly payroll.”150 Also, two lieutenants at the base committed suicide over gambling debts.151 In 1998 
military readiness was obviously still a concern as there were “reports of suicides and enlisted men pawning 
their uniforms to pay gambling debts.”152 However, Major General James Powell, commander of Keesler AFB, 
believed that the situation was “a civilian problem, not a military one.”153 He concluded that the problem “must 
be met by the citizens of the community and their elected leaders.”154 Even so, by 1999 this gambling region 
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had experienced thirteen gambling-related suicides during a 2-year period among military personnel and their 
families, and the military instituted gambling-education courses.155 
                                                           
155 Military Personnel Panel Discussion and Report, (KAIM-296 radio broadcast, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar. 25, 1999). 
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PART V 
Trends and Conditioning Factors 
A. Case Studies: Casinos on the Mississippi Coast 
Serious attempts to rid the Mississippi Gulf Coast of illegal gambling began in 1951 when U.S. Senator Estes 
Kefauver and the Preparedness Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services held a hearing 
in Biloxi, Mississippi.156 However, by 1989 an oxymoron of legislative action was proposed toward legalizing 
formal gambling. Via quick action and carefully crafted scenarios, casino lobbyists were able to clear hurdle 
after hurdle, dodging “Christian” legislators and avoiding social-impact studies.157 One Mississippi legislator 
complained that “[I]t all happened so fast, we hardly had time to vote on the bill, much less read it.”158 
Legislators did not take the time to consider the possible costs of legalizing gambling, such as increased crime 
rates, pathological and problem gambling, higher taxes to address highway and sanitation system demands, and 
harmful effects upon existing businesses.159 Although the casinos improved overall economic conditions in 
localized areas like Tunica County, the gap between blacks and whites widened as “casino carpetbaggers”160 
continued to argue they were creating jobs and revenue. The gambling industry was criticized for utilizing 
“racial, ethnic, and religious targeting.”161 Ben Toledano concluded that decriminalized organized gambling led 
“to political control over individuals, communities, and local and state governments.”162 
B. Uncle Sam’s Military Casinos 
As the Twenty-First Century began, a “depressed” Gloria Calhoun, a USAF technical sergeant stationed in 
South Korea, wrote approximately $14,000 in bad checks to pay for the debts she accumulated from slot 
machine playing around her base.163 The Department of Defense received from people like Sergeant Calhoun “a 
tidy sum [$125 million in 2000] from more than 7,000 slot and video poker machines on 94 U.S. military 
installations overseas.”164 Pentagon officials argued that gambling revenues constituted “an essential and 
harmless source of funding,”165 yet Sergeant Calhoun was demoted and given a sixty-day jail sentence due to 
this “harmless” way to pay for U.S. morale boosters.166 As an example, the question remained: “What was and 
is Sergeant Calhoun’s military readiness level?” Experts on gambling addiction have demonstrated that 
gambling can foster a dependency that may lead to criminal behaviors like Sergeant Calhoun’s.167 In 2002, the 
national media reported on two of the DOD’s studies which concluded that approximately two percent of U.S. 
military personnel (or 30,000 people) had the “indicators of probable pathological gambling,” a startling figure 
suggesting that these people could act similarly to Sergeant Calhoun.168 In the national press, the Pentagon’s 
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Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Department was castigated for ignoring these problems when the Department 
announced that “[s]lot machines have no negative impact on troops overseas.”169 
                                                           
169 Id. 
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PART VI 
Policy Alternatives and Recommendations 
A. Ban All Gambling in the U.S. Military 
1. Prohibition of Command-Sanctioned Military Gambling 
In 2001, President George W. Bush began taking a Harvard MBA look at the military, which included 
establishing clear strategic objectives, motivating military personnel via higher pay to achieve those objectives, 
and determining the cost effectiveness of weapons systems in meeting proscribed objectives.170 According to 
the Christian Science Monitor, “[t]he welfare of our troops would be improved if the Pentagon also took a good 
hard look at the vice of gambling that it permits and perpetuates on military bases.”171 During the early 1990s, 
the U.S. Army’s Community and Family Support Center considered running an official lottery on overseas U.S. 
military bases and paid $49,000 for a worldwide sample of military opinion.172 Apparently, the Pentagon 
abandoned the project pursuant to the evidence of increased addicted gambling; however, thousands of video 
poker and slot machines continued to be operated on overseas military bases.173 The impacts of these machines 
on military personnel can be devastating, especially to those with a gambling addiction. This was the case for 
Senior Airman Lenyatta Tinelle, who in one year lost $28,000 while serving at the Keflavik, Iceland base.174 
U.S. Representative Roscoe Bartlett concluded that these slot machines should be eliminated and has expressed 
his concern saying “We have no right to put this type of temptation in front of our young people.”175 
Accordingly, the President has been urged to eliminate these machines on U.S. military bases, which would be 
consistent with the espoused good management approach toward military issues.176 
2. The Cost/Benefit of Military Gambling Machines 
a. Decreased “Military Readiness” for Benefits of Only $127 Million in Military Welfare Funds? 
It was arguable that the military’s overseas slot machines were a gamble in themselves.177 The proponents of the 
slot machines argued that the $127 million in income from the slots was needed to support programs in the 
military.178 Those against military slot machines focused on the harmful effects on addicted military personnel 
and their families.179 By 1999, there were ninety-four bases and other posts that possessed slot machines, and 
the $127 million lost by military personnel was used to fund “morale, welfare, and recreation” activities. 180 
According to Arnie Wexler, a consultant on pathological and problem gambling, “[t]hey’re [the military] taking 
money from their own people and dependents of those people.”181 Accordingly, experts recommended that the 
military should prohibit electronic gambling devices, video poker machines, and other modern forms of slots 
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which sociologists commonly referenced “as the crack cocaine of gambling, creating new, addicted 
gamblers.”182 
b. The Strategic Costs of Pathological Gambling 
i. The 1999 Australia Productivity Commission183 
In Australia more was gambled away in 1999 than was saved by the public, and the pathological gambling rate 
was 2.3 percent.184 Significantly, 1.5 percent of the gross domestic product involved wagers in legalized 
gambling activities.185 There were 18 million people in Australia, and in 1992, they lost $5 billion in legalized 
gambling activities.186 By 1998, this amount had more than doubled to $11 billion187 and half of that amount 
was lost in electronic gambling devices (including video gambling machines).188 
ii. The Socio-Economic Costs of Each New Pathological (Addicted) Gambler 
Prior to the mid-1990s, the medical and social costs associated with treating and remedying the negatives 
committed by the individual pathological gambler ranged between $13,200 and $52,000 (unadjusted to present 
value).189 The higher numbers were published and/or verified in a reviewed article published in the Journal of 
Gambling Behavior.190 The higher end of the spectrum was given the actual or implied imprimatur of the 
Journal—even though the Journal was influenced, to a greater or lesser degree, by the interests of the gambling 
industry. In particular, William Eadington became one of the two main editors of the Journal when its 
predecessor, the Journal of Gambling Behavior, ran into financial difficulty and needed the support of the 
gambling industry. 
Professor Henry Lesieur, the originator and first editor of the Journal of Gambling Behavior (renamed the 
Journal of Gambling Studies in 1990 with William Eadington as co-editor) repeatedly reported statistics on 
pathological gambling and its associated costs.191 These costs closely paralleled those statistics and tables in the 
2001 Mega-Lawsuits article. 
Since the cost estimates ranging up to $52,000 per pathological gambler were published and the 
methodology of determining them verified by the Journal, the gambling industry has been trying to lower these 
cost estimates via promoting new studies.192 Critics of the gambling industry found it ironic that apologists for 
the gambling industry, including Mr. Eadington, had not questioned any of these higher cost estimates 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s—even though they claimed years of experience in analyzing these 
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issues.193 Since the mid-1990s, the gambling industry has endeavored to promulgate new cost estimates—which 
as might be expected, have been lower than the earlier estimates.194 
c. Decriminalized Gambling: The “Acceptability Factor” and the “Accessibility Factor” 
For decades pro-gambling interests would not recognize that gambling created pathological and problem 
gamblers until an industry-financed study revealed that “Legality Spreads The Compulsion to Gamble,”195 as 
reported by the New York Times. “Casino industry executives, who market their products as harmless adult 
entertainment, until [December 1997] had been loathe to concede that some gamblers become addicted.”196 That 
more people will become hooked on gambling as it is “legalized”197 and “spreads”198 to new jurisdictions 
(known as the “acceptability” and “accessibility” principles) was summarized by Howard Shaffer when he 
reported on his 1997 study of pathological and problem gamblers: “The people who are most sensitive to social 
sanctions or social pressures only began to gamble when it became legal in more places.”199 
B. Recognize Erroneous Information in the Age of Terrorism: Credibility Issues and Pro-Gambling 
Influences 
1. Recommendation: Follow the Money 
In the Twenty-First Century Age of Terrorism, as in all important issue areas, accurate information is essential. 
The importance of communicating relevant, authoritative, and current information that “could have foiled some 
of the 9/11 hijackers”200 was highlighted by the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center.201 In this context, 
some industries might have an inherent interest in repressing or controlling information that could damage or 
even eliminate their financial base. Accordingly, credibility issues become important and in a legal context, the 
impeachment of industry informational sources becomes relevant. In 1994, the Columbia Journalism Review 
indicated what the threshold test is: Follow the Money.202 
2. Recommendation: Encourage the Academic Community to Divorce Itself from the Direct and Indirect 
Financial Aura of Pro-Gambling Interests 
During the 1990s, national U.S. press sources raised issues involving the appearance of direct and/or indirect 
conflicts of interest in the interface between academics/experts and pro-gambling interests.203 The only practical 
method for avoiding such criticisms was for impacted members of the academic community to divorce 
themselves completely from a financial interface with pro-gambling interests. Accordingly, some academics/ 
experts, such as several at the University of Illinois, refused to receive any honoraria, consultant fees, or even 
grants from any pro-gambling interests or other special interests. 
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In the article The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Should the States Initiate Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the 
Tobacco Cases?204 (Mega-Lawsuits) it was appropriate to recap some of the issues already raised by the national 
media involving the financial aura projected by pro-gambling interests and the potential impeachment of 
witnesses. Contrary to implications by gambling industry apologists that only one national news outlet had 
raised these issues, these types of issues have been raised for example by: 
a. The Chronicle of Higher Education,205 
b. The Philadelphia Inquirer,206 
c. A series of Los Angeles Times articles,207 
d. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch,208 
e. The New York Times,209 
f. A series of articles in Mother Jones Investigative Magazine,210 and  
g. The Columbia Journalism Review,211 et alia. 
When numerous national media stories have raised similar credibility issues, the academic community must 
necessarily address them as well. The primary goal should be for the academic community to eliminate all 
direct and indirect financial links to pro-gambling interests or other special interests. Some academics/experts 
who attempted to maintain a degree of contact with the pro-gambling interests during the 1990s via the 
grant/research process eventually felt that they had to distance themselves from those gambling interests 
presumably to maintain their own ethical standards.212 
3. Recommendation: Encourage More Public Scrutiny 
The millions of dollars which pro-gambling interests have utilized to promote or impact research may return to 
haunt the industry and associated research interests. The national media and academia have indicated that the 
following groups may face particular scrutiny: 
a. The National Center for Responsible Gaming (NCRG) founded in 1996 by the American Gaming 
Association,213 
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b. The Journal of Gambling Studies after pro-gambling interests began significant funding circa 1990 
(formerly the Journal of Gambling Behavior),214 
c. The Gaming Law Review founded in 1997 but which has no university affiliation,215 
d. The National Council on Problem Gambling (NCPG),216 and 
e. The UNLV Boyd Law School,217 founded in 1996–97. 
 
The 2001 President of the NCRG,218 whose associated company pledged $875,000 to the NCRG, also 
provided the primary contribution of $5 million to establish the UNLV Boyd Law School.219 
Critics argued that the financial aura of pro-gambling interests could have the effect of tainting the research 
process. In reviewing the NCRG, the news media made some comparisons to the tobacco industry: 
Some critics see an analogy with cigarette manufacturers, which for decades financed medical 
studies on tobacco—and were later found to have suppressed evidence that cigarettes were 
harmful. 
“It’s the Tobacco Institute of gambling,” grumbled Bernie Horn [the former] 
legislative director for the National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling in Washington. 
“The Tobacco Institute used to fund all these studies about how smoking is good for you,” 
Horn said, contending that the gambling industry is essentially doing the same thing.220 
While there may not always be full disclosure of the degree of involvement or influence exercised by the 
AGA lobbying group and its associates in various organizations, many academics, experts, and government 
decisionmakers will need to explore these issues and then decide whether to embrace or divorce themselves 
from suspect groups. When AGA representatives and lobbyists blatantly seek visibility in some groups, a 
fortiori the nonvisible influences of the AGA’s philosophies become more problematic to decisionmakers. 
Upon being made aware of the apparent direct and indirect conflicts of interest outlined in the Mega-Lawsuits 
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article, academics/experts should divorce themselves from the gambling industry’s umbra and rejoin 
mainstream academia.221 
4. Recommendation: Focus on the Relevant Issues: Are Pro-Gambling Interests Obfuscating the Obvious? 
The personalized defense of pro-gambling interests speaks for itself—res ipsa loquitur. However, researchers 
should note the paucity of footnotes (e.g., a couple dozen) in most studies by pro-gambling interests—which 
also frequently cite to other industry-financed studies and materials. By comparison, the Mega-Lawsuits article 
sometimes criticized by pro-gambling consultants has 372 footnotes plus 15 tables.222 
As indicated in such academic publications as the Harvard Law Review,223 the types of criticisms 
promulgated by the gambling industry parallel the types of tactics and responses utilized by some defenders of 
the tobacco industry.224 A 1999 article in the Harvard Law Review complained that “[t]obacco manufacturers 
tried to portray scientists who reached conclusions about the adverse effects of smoking as zealots who would 
do anything, including conducting flawed science, to put the industry out of business.”225 Unfortunately, it is in 
this context that analyses must be made. Still, it is essential to examine those gambling issues impacting U.S. 
military personnel and concomitant military readiness and not allow representatives of the U.S. gambling 
industry to obfuscate the obvious. 
5. Recommendation: Follow Frank Fahrenkopf the Washington Lobbyist for the American Gaming 
Association: All in the Family? 
In 1995, Frank Fahrenkopf helped found and then became the CEO of the Washington-based lobbying group, 
the American Gaming Association (AGA), which had a budget of over $4 million per year.226 He also became a 
Board Member of the National Center for Responsible Gaming (NCRG) formed by the AGA in 1996227 with a 
multi-million-dollar budget provided almost exclusively by the gambling industry.228 He also served on the 
editorial board of the “self-styled Gaming Law Review—whose name is misleading since it has no university 
sponsor.”229 “Founded in 1997 and publishing many pro-industry articles, the Gaming Review is vulnerable to 
being labeled as primarily a gambling industry publication.”230 “With a few exceptions, the editorial board for 
the Gaming Review consists of gambling industry consultants, columnists for industry magazines, and 
lobbyists.”231 
In the first volume of the Gaming Review, editorial board member Keith S. Whyte first utilized the 
“American Gaming Association” as his organizational identifier, but thereafter he became head of the National 
Council on Problem Gambling and was subsequently identified with the NCPG.232 William Eadington has been 
listed on the editorial board of the Gaming Review since its first issues even though he appears to have no 
“legal” background or degrees.233 By 1999 the two main editors of the Gaming Review were both associated 
with or made money from the gambling industry.234 
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The 2001 Annual Report of the NCRG indicated that almost all of the NCRG’s multi-million dollar budget 
was provided by gambling companies and pro-gambling interests.235 The two chief editors of the Journal of 
Gambling Studies, William Eadington and Howard Shaffer, were also associated with the NCRG. The NCRG’s 
Annual Report indicated that the NCRG contracted to establish the Institute for Research on Pathological 
Gambling and Related Disorders236 which the press reported as a de facto move of the NCRG from Kansas City 
to the Harvard Division on Addictions with Howard Shaffer.237 Mr. Eadington was listed as a member of the 
Institute’s Program Advisory Board “whose role is to counsel the Institute on all aspects of its program,”238 and 
Shaffer was listed as “Staff,”239 as well as on the “NCRG Board of Directors.”240 
To avoid these types of observations, which could become issues in future scenarios, all academics/experts 
should be alert to these considerations and should completely divest themselves of these and similar 
associations.241 
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PART VII 
Conclusion 
A. Reinstitute the Ban on Electronic/Video Gambling Devices on U.S. Bases and Facilities 
The U.S. Armed Forces should reinstitute the historical ban on electronic/video gambling devices and slot 
machines due to the costs of training military personnel, related suicides, and the costs of reducing “military 
readiness”—as thousands of new personnel become addicted or problem gamblers. In the Twenty-First 
Century’s Age of Terrorism, the $127 million in recreational funds generated by the machines were miniscule 
compared to the larger policy issues involving “military readiness.” Furthermore, the Department of Defense 
should be wary of competing budget interests; namely, U.S. gambling lobbyists who could finesse a $40 billion 
tax write-off for electronic gambling devices justified as an economic stimulus to counter the economic 
consequences of the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. 
B. Academic/Experts Should Completely Divorce Themselves from the Direct and/or Indirect Financial 
Aura of Pro-Gambling Interests 
When multiple sources in the national media begin raising similar questions of potential financial conflicts 
of interest in several research areas, then members of the academic community should take note and divorce 
themselves from those apparent financial conflicts. Accordingly, some academics, including several at the 
University of Illinois, decline to accept any honoraria, consultant fees, or research grants from pro-gambling 
interests or other special interests. By adopting a similar policy, the concerns voiced in the national media, 
including the Chronicle of Higher Education,242 could be quieted. 
                                                           
242 Id. 
